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The economic stagnation that Japan experienced between 1990 and 2003, what the 
Japanese have dubbed as the “lost decade,” marked the end of four decades of impressive 
economic growth Hence, examining the causes of that economic crisis has attracted much 
attention (Amyx, 2004; Beason and Patterson, 2004; Grimes, 2001; Katz, 1998; Lincoln, 2001; 
Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010).    Moreover, the lost decade’s impact has lingered. The global 
financial crisis of 2008 pushed Japan back into the economic doldrums, and the nation has had to 
cope with the challenge of rebuilding after the Great Japan Eastern Earthquake of March, 2011.    
This study finds that a determination that evolved in the mid-late-1980s to carry through 
a specific program of economic reforms shaped the slow response of the business community, as 
represented by Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organizations), to the onset of the 
nation’s economic crisis in the early 1990s.  This commitment inhibited rapid and bold 
intervention by the government to stimulate the economy. On the other hand, this reform agenda 
encouraged the types of major legal changes and shifts in management practices that some 
scholars argue have now occurred in Japan (Schaede, 2012). Today, Keidanren (now Nippon 
Keidanren) is still advocating the same basic policies that it did twenty-five years ago. 
 The contours of what happened during the lost decade are well known (see Warner, 
2011).  The trouble started after 1985 with financial speculation that fueled a rise in the prices of 
stocks and then in the price of real estate.  The Nikkei average on the Tokyo stock exchange 
tripled from 13,000 yen in 1986 to 39,000 yen by the end of 1989.  The price of land quintupled 
between 1985 and 1991 (Itō 2007, 124).  By 1989, concern about these trends led officials at the 
Bank of Japan to begin a rapid increase in its discount rate, from 2.5 percent to 6 percent in 




supply of money (Grimes 2001, 141-142; Flath 2005, 132). Although Japanese officials were 
trying to engineer a soft landing by gradually deflating the speculative bubble, it burst with 
surprising speed.  By October, 1990, the Nikkei had fallen to nearly 20,000 yen. The price of real 
estate began its descent in 1991 (Flath 2005, 145 and 141).  Underscoring the continuing effects 
of the collapse of the markets, the stock market in 2003 remained mired at the level of 7,000 yen, 
while by 2005 land prices had given up all of their gains of the late 1980s (Itō 2007, 140).  Non-
performing loans piled up at banks. Economic growth virtually ground to a halt, as it averaged 
only one percent per year from 1990 to 2003.   
Review of the Literature 
 As one might expect, analysts are still trying to discern the causes of this economic 
collapse.  As Kikkawa Takeo has pointed out, Japanese scholars have often seemed at a loss to 
explain in a systematic way how characteristics of corporate governance and management that 
drove economic success for decades suddenly failed after 1990 (Kikkawa 2005, 22-28). Among 
Western scholars, one approach to explaining this course of events has centered on arguing that 
despite Japan’s impressive record of economic growth during the previous four decades, major 
sectors of the economy had become inefficient as a result of government protectionism (Beason 
and Patterson, 2004; Katz, 1998; Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010).  Other analyses have focused on 
the specific ways in which the economic collapse unfolded after 1989.  Why, some have asked, 
did the Japanese government respond so slowly? Noting that Japan experienced an 
“extraordinary delay” of eight years in responding to the banks’ problem of bad debt, one scholar 
describes the “mismanagement of banking sector woes” as “enigmatic” (Amyx 2004, 1-2 and 6). 
The Bank of Japan eventually slashed its discount rate to nearly zero percent, but took five years 




issue its first estimate of the total amount of bad loans held by Japanese banks.  According to one 
observer, before 1998 only the budgets of 1994 and 1995 were “truly stimulatory” (Metzler 
2008, 657).  
The aim of this study is to examine the attitudes and actions of Keidanren, as the 
economic crisis developed during the early 1990s.  Carrying on the legacy of the Japan 
Economic League (Nihon Keizai Renmeikai) in the interwar period, Keidanren during the post-
1945 era has been considered the most powerful representative of big business in Japan.  During 
several decades prior to 1990, the Japanese business community had astutely sized up changing 
economic circumstances and had adjusted accordingly.  The first oil crisis of 1973-1974, when 
the Arab oil embargo and a resulting spike in oil prices had brought both a recession and high 
inflation, had provided the most recent example.  Japanese firms had responded by becoming 
much more energy efficient (Kikkawa 2005, 17).  Why, then, in this instance did the Japanese 
business community miss the boat, so to speak? 
Propositions 
 The perspective of the Japanese business community during the crisis has not received 
adequate attention.  Presumably, if Japanese business leaders had been clamoring in the late 
1980s for measures to prevent a speculative bubble or in the early 1990s to respond promptly and 
forcefully to its collapse, those opinions would have had some impact on government officials.  
The question then arises as to why business leaders did not make these demands.   
One could conjecture [1.] that Japanese executives had incentives not to confront 
publically Japan’s economic crisis, because they did not wish to advertize their mismanagement.  
For example, banks initially may not have wanted to draw attention to their rapidly increasing 




7).  Firms in some other sectors, however, might well have not felt the same constraints.  One 
could also conjecture [2.] that what one might call the “mind-set” of a broad segment of the 
Japanese business community, represented by Keidanren, in the late 1980s and early 1990 
created a major obstacle.   
The leaders of Keidanren had developed by the late 1980s such a firm definition of the 
economic challenges facing Japan and of the necessary solutions that this perspective blinded 
them to the crisis that was building underneath their feet and, once it erupted, to the need for the 
quick action that it demanded. This stance became manifest in the “Keidanren shūhō [Keidanren 
Weekly Reports]” as well as special reports issued by the federation and public statements by its 
leaders. 
Envisioning an Historic Shift in the Japanese Economy 
 To understand the attitudes of Keidanren toward developments in the Japanese economy 
in the early 1990s, one first has to examine the specific circumstances of the mid-1980s and the 
federation’s response to them.  One major economic problem in the mid-1980s was the 
increasingly severe friction between Japan and its largest foreign market, the United States, 
because of the large surplus of Japanese exports there compared to imports from the United 
States.    
 In this atmosphere, the Economic Investigation Group (Keizai Chōsakai) of the 
federation issued a major report in 1985 enunciating the need for basic changes in Japan’s 
financial and economic policies.  The nation, the report argued, faced an historical “turning 
point” (Keidanren shūhō, 1985, 2).  It placed a top priority on reducing overseas criticism of 
Japanese surpluses in foreign trade.  Japan had to stimulate domestic demand, remove barriers to 




 The report posited that fiscal and administrative reforms of the government were essential 
to reviving the economy’s vitality.  Claiming that Japan’s fiscal situation was “the worst among 
advanced nations,” Keidanren pleaded for a balanced national budget.  The report noted with 
approval that a Temporary Administrative Research Council appointed by the government had 
begun work in March, 1981, on ways to streamline the bureaucracy.  Because raising taxes to 
pay for national bonds would exhaust the economy, Japan had to aim to “emerge from a 
dependence on deficit national bonds by 1990.” (Keidanren shūhō, 1985, 5-6).   
 In general, the Japanese had to unleash the potential dynamism of the private sector both 
to raise the people’s quality of life and to become more economically competitive.  Japan, 
according to the report, had a large Gross National Product but fewer real assets than other 
developed nations in terms of infrastructure, such as roads, housing, sewers, and parks.  One 
solution was for the private sector to play a greater role in providing these resources (Keidanren 
shūhō, 1985, 6-7).  Of course, to do so companies would have to create and keep more capital 
(Keidanren shūhō, 1985, 7-9). Policies of deregulation and tax cuts evolving in the United States 
provided worthy models for Japan (Keidanren shūhō, 1985, 9). In the future the government had 
to spur the “creativity of enterprises” by “revising the circumstances of enterprise management 
starting with deregulation.”  The report’s emphasis on the comparatively low corporate tax rate 
in England and the United States and on the increase in the Japanese rate since 1980 suggested 
the need for a major reform of the national tax structure (Keidanren shūhō, 1985, 9-10).   
 In brief, this report of May, 1985, presented an agenda for reform that aspired to 
historical significance in altering the fundamental principles of previous economic policy.  To 
blunt foreign criticism of Japan’s growing trade surplus, the economy had to switch from growth 




the private sector, the government had to abandon deficit financing and liberate the energy of 
private enterprise.  
 Just a few months after this report, the so-called Plaza Accord seemed to confirm the 
need for a more vigorous and competitive economy. In September, 1985, the Group of Five—
France, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany—agreed in New York 
City to coordinate their policies to effect a depreciation of the value of the U.S. dollar relative to 
other currencies, including the Japanese yen.  The prospect of a sharply appreciating yen caused 
considerable alarm within Japanese business circles because of the obvious potential effect on 
the nation’s trade balance.    
Keidanren continued to stress the need to enhance the competitiveness of Japanese firms, 
especially through the reform of national taxes. During 1986 the federation continued to 
complain that Japan’s corporate tax rate was higher than that of other developed nations and that 
the income tax unfairly burdened Japan’s managerial employees.  Ideally, the tax system should 
spread the burden of financing the government more equally among all citizens through an 
“indirect tax system in which the people would share the burden thinly and widely” (Keizai 
Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 623).  In December, the governing Liberal Democratic Party proposed a 
“moderation” of the graduated nature of the income tax, a lowering of the corporate tax below 50 
percent, and the introduction of a 5 percent national sales tax (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 
625). 
 The federation participated actively in the national debate that followed.  In early 1987, 
Saitō Eishirō, the chairman of Keidanren, declared that “there is no reason that only Japan rejects 
a sales tax that is common internationally.”  After the LDP in 1988 endorsed a cut in the 




report of the federation’s Public Finance Committee in October noted approvingly that the 
current plan of the LDP “basically follows our thinking.”  A “very large” tax cut for the middle 
income group represented by company managers would stimulate consumption and advance “the 
arrival of an economy led by domestic demand.”  Japan would also join other advanced nations 
by slashing the corporate tax to 37.5 percent. (Keidanren shūhō, 1988b, 2-4).  The Diet finally 
passed the legislation at the end of the year.  Subsequently, the cabinet maintained its incipient 
trend of lessening its budgetary dependence on bonds so that from 1990 to 1993 the government 
issued no deficit bonds (Grimes 2001, 77). 
 Representatives of large corporations in Japan also sought to reduce trade friction in 
major markets. The federation from 1986 to 1989 consistently advocated the elimination of 
barriers to imports and stimulating internal demand (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 523-526 and 
582).  Many members backed the deregulation of agricultural imports, more efficient handling of 
imports, and substantial reform of the Large Store Law that strictly regulated the spread of 
supermarkets and large retail stores in commercial areas populated by small shops (Keizai Dantai 
Rengōkai 1999, 556-557 and 589-594).  
 As a more general strategy, the federation firmly supported a broad movement to reduce 
the role and size of government through “administrative reform.”  At the end of 1986, Chairman 
Otsuki Bunpei explained the need to reverse previous attitudes toward government interference 
in the private sector by “making the principle freedom, the exception regulation,” minimizing 
“administrative guidance,” and instilling the “principle of the self-responsibility of the people” 
(Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 557-559). Keidanren later proposed “to make 1988 the year of 
implementing ‘small government’” with a ceiling on the national budget and the continued 




need to end “120 years” of “regulation and protection” and the specific goal of eliminating 50 
percent of all regulations (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 562-563).  
Coping with a Disaster 
 Overall, economic trends in the late 1980s inspired confidence in the economy.  Real 
economic growth chugged along at a real rate of 4-5 percent per year.  The issuance of 
government bonds fell and the trade surplus declined.  In 1988, the government White Paper on 
the economy claimed that Japan had “overcome the high yen recession since the fall of 1985” 
and had switched to a pattern of “economic growth led by domestic demand.”  By June, 1990, 
Japan had experienced 43 months of economic expansion (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 542-
543).  In this context, the soaring prices of stocks and of real estate may have appeared as simply 
irksome aberrations because other economic indicators were so strong.  For example, a 
Keidanren report in June, 1988, acknowledged the soaring price of land but viewed this 
development not as a threat to overall economic growth but as just a specific obstacle to solving 
the problem of overcrowding in some urban areas. According to the report, deregulation would 
lead to better planning for the use of land and increasing its supply (Keidanren shūhō, 1988a, 5). 
Members of the Economic Policy Committee accepted without challenge a positive economic 
forecast of officials from the Economic Planning Agency who took comfort from the low 
unemployment rate and three years of stable prices (Keidanren shūhō, 1989a, 2-3).   
Indeed, because the leaders of Keidanren harbored a fear of inflation, they would view 
the initial descent of the price of land as benign.  While the federation issued a generally 
favorable outlook for the economy in 1990, the group’s forecast included a concern about the 
importance of keeping prices stable (Keidanren shūhō, 1989b, 6).  In fact, a major assessment of 




could carry over to the new decade. In this perspective, the fall of stock prices and land prices 
represented a positive “correction of asset inflation” (Keidanren shūhō, 1991, 3-4). 
 If this assessment anticipated no immediate economic problems, it continued the 
drumbeat for a fundamental shift in national economic policies.  On the positive side, the report 
took pride in the nation’s recovery from the threat posed by the rapidly appreciating yen after the 
Plaza Accord by switching from an export led economy to one fueled more by domestic growth. 
Moreover, the “emergence from reliance on bonds” to finance deficit spending had begun. The 
authors predicted a respectable real economic growth rate of 4 percent in the first half of the 
1990s and 3.5 percent in the second half of the decade (Keidanren shūhō, 1991, 3 and 5). Still, 
the times demanded change. The broadest challenge lay in moderating the strong bureaucratic 
leadership evident since the Meiji era and “creating a ‘market economy’ led by the private 
sector” that would be “strong and flexible.” “The 1990s” would be nothing less than a “turning 
point in world history” because of the spread of globalization and increased competition.  
“Japan’s national economic society had reached an important turning point” as well.  The 
maturing of the economy and the aging of society threatened to bring a dramatic drop in 
economic dynamism.  Various areas of the economy, such as the distribution and retail sector, 
had to become more productive through the introduction of market principles.  Moreover, Japan 
should also contribute to “global development” by becoming “a truly open international market 
for capital and finance.”  Touting a “new economic democracy,” Keidanren advocated that “[a]s 
needs diversify Japanese must reject government interference and advance deregulation” 
(Keidanren shūhō, 1991, 3 and 6-10). 
 Japanese bankers were also slow to recognize the financial crisis that was about to 




Kyōkai/JBA) revealed a sharp drop in the rate of growth in lending by the 12 city banks (Yomiuri 
shinbun, 1991a).  The chairman of the JBA, Suematsu Ken’ichi, refused to advocate a cut in the 
Bank of Japan’s discount rate, because “there is [some] doubt as to whether speculation has 
disappeared” (Yomiuri shinbun, 1991b)..  Two months later, when the JBA released data 
showing that for all 154 members of the JBA deposits and the value of financial assets fell for 
the first time since 1948 (Yomiuri shinbun, 1991d), Suematsu termed a cut in the discount rate 
“appropriate.” He cautioned, however, that “one cannot say that the bubble economy has calmed 
down uniformly across the entire country.  The magma remains underneath.  In the future, 
vigilance is necessary” (Yomiuri shinbun, 1991e). Bankers, in fact, during the early 1990s 
seemed more concerned about competition from the government’s postal savings system than 
with the direction of the economy (Yomiuri shinbun, 1991c).  
 Gradually, leaders of the business community began to realize the severity of the 
economic crisis that was unfolding through the steep drop in first the stock market and then the 
price of real estate.  In September Hiraiwa Gaishi, the chairman of Keidanren, had joined the call 
for lowering the Bank of Japan’s discount rate and reiterated his support in December while 
noting that “the freezing of the investment mind-set [maindo] of enterprises is severe beyond 
expectations” (Yomiuri shinbun, 1991g).  The first cut in the discount rate occurred in the second 
half of 1991, and over the next three years it declined step-by-step to 0.5 percent in 1995 
(Grimes, 2001, 95). Some business leaders, however, advocated further action.  Saitō Hiroshi, 
the chairman of the Japan Steel Federation (Nihon Tekkō Renmeikai), fumed, “one cannot say 
that the cut [in the discount rate] is adequate.  I want to expect from now on flexible policies 
from the authorities” (Yomiuri shinbun, 1991g). After observing two months later that the 




by hinting at the need for an expansive fiscal policy: “…there is some unease as to whether one 
can revive with only financial measures the frozen mind-set of enterprises.  One must have some 
vitality from the side of public finance” (Yomiuri shinbun 1992a).  
 The steep fall of the average stock market price in March, 1992, below 20,000 yen, a 
drop of almost 50 percent since early 1990, sparked a new sense of urgency.  Sentiment within 
the business community leaned toward support for two measures: a large-scale supplement to the 
national budget to stimulate demand and major cuts in taxes on investment and/or on income 
(Yomiuri shinbun, 1992c). Even though the banking sector began to favor reducing taxes and 
utilizing deficit spending to stimulate the economy (Yomiuri shinbun, 1993a), most of those 
leading the charge for such policies came from the manufacturing and retail sectors.  A vice-
president of the New Japan Steel Company (Shin Nihon Seitetsu) urged more public investment 
in the national budget (Yomiuri shinbun, 1992b). The president of the Daiei Department Store 
Chain opined that an “income tax cut was necessary to revive the consumption mind-set.”  
Muramatsu Atsushi, the vice-president of the Nissan Automobile Company, and Saito Hiroshi, 
the chairman of the Japan Steel Federation, each predicted that the cabinet’s timidity would 
delay economic recovery by a year (Yomiuri shinbun, 1992d). Kume Yutaka, chairman of the 
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (Nihon Jidōsha Kōgyōkai) declared, “I would like 
to have [the government] first reduce taxes and stimulate consumption.  There is no alternative to 
issuing deficit bonds” (Yomiuri shinbun, 1993b).   
 As pressure grew for a tax cut, the Tax System Investigation Committee appointed by the 
government issued an interim report that proposed combining a reduction in the income tax with 
a raise in the consumption tax.  Hiraiwa, the chairman of Keidanren, voiced support by saying 




consumption tax.”  The burden of the income tax, he implied, far outweighed any negative 
effects of the consumption tax.  Inaba Kōsaku, the chairman of the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce, made the obvious point, however, that overall raising one tax would offset whatever 
benefits might accrue from lowering the other tax. Sekimoto Tadahiro, chairman of the Japan 
Electrical Manufacturers Association, exclaimed in exasperation, “The idea of lowering the 
income tax and raising the consumption tax as a package is a product of people who do not 
realize the severity of business conditions.”  He favored reducing the income tax first and 
deciding about the consumption tax after the economy had improved.  Itakura Yoshiaki, 
chairman of the Japan Department Store Association, asserted that increasing the consumption 
tax would “ignore the psychology (shinri) of consumers” (Yomiuri shinbun, 1993c).  
 Meanwhile banks began to push for the strategy of using public funds to help clear away 
their growing stores of non-performing loans.  As the Ministry of Finance began to track the 
increase in non-performing loans and complaints about the tightening of credit “becoming 
shackles on the recovery of business conditions” escalated, banks felt more pressure to redeem 
bad debt to create “assets that will generate profit.”  In this context arose the idea of using public 
funds to help financial institutions with this task (Yomiuri shinbun, 1994).  The issue continued 
to percolate over the next two years.   
 By the late fall of 1995, the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance were exploring 
the use of public funds to replenish the capital of banks as they redeemed their own non-
performing loans and those of seven subsidiary “mortgage institutions” (jūtaku kinyū senmon 
kaisha/jūsen) that faced bankruptcy (Yomiuri shinbun, 1995e). In November, Hashimoto Toru, 




performing loans that would take several years as opposed to a quick redemption, which would 
require a much larger one-time infusion of public funds (Yomiuri shinbun, 1995d).  
 As other business groups called for more forceful government intervention, Keidanren 
essentially held fast to its comprehensive prescription for the economy that it presented in 1985.  
This strategy included a healthy dose of fiscal conservatism.  The federation refused to endorse 
tax cuts without an increase in the consumption tax. The leaders of Keidanren rarely took their 
eye off of what they considered their main long-term goal of promoting small government and 
altering the basic character of the Japanese economy by liberating the private sector from 
bureaucratic constraints.   
Accordingly, the federation continued to devote much of its energy to pushing for 
structural changes, such as administrative reform  and deregulation in order to invigorate the 
private sector, rationalize and “slim” the government, and spur “competition and the 
transparency” of the economy as a whole.  The group proudly noted that in July, 1994, the 
cabinet of Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro had adopted 112 of the 163 proposals that the 
group had submitted for eliminating regulations (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 853-860). This 
stance generally resonated with other business groups, as they, too, could agree in principle with 
the goal of reducing bureaucratic interference in the economy, even if they also wanted more 
governmental action to stimulate the economy.   
 By 1995 the leaders of the federation had yielded some ground on budgetary issues but 
still advocated fiscal restraint.  In 1992, representatives of Keidanren had rejected a suggestion 
by Prime Minister Miyazawa Ki’ichi to use public funds to help banks with non-performing 
loans (Amyx, 2004, 159). When the Ministry of Finance asked for the organization’s opinion 




[the government] had to invest public funds to solve the problem of non-performing loans.”  In 
the medium and long term, “measures that stress regulation of the [financial] market [were] 
necessary” to prevent further problems in the future (Keizai Dantai Rengōkai 1999, 876-877). 
Subsequently, the federation forcefully backed the use of public funds to restore international 
confidence in Japan’s financial markets (Yomiuri shinbun, 1996b, and 1996c).  Still, the leaders 
of Keidanren remained cautious.  In December, 1995, the chairman, Toyoda Shōichirō, reacted 
to the expansive national budget proposed for 1996 by advising, “Now, it’s important to plan an 
increase in taxes with the recovery of business conditions and with a radical reform of tax 
finances in the medium and long term to reform the fiscal situation” (Yomiuri shinbun, 1995g). 
 In keeping with Keidanren’s previous stance, a major report that the group issued in 
October, 1995, emphasized the need for basic structural reforms.  Once again, the federation 
depicted a critical turning point, “an important crossroads of the continuance of prosperity or its 
decline.” “The cause of the structural difficulties that Japan is facing today,” the report intoned, 
“is the stagnation of the social system since [the] Meiji [era] of bureaucratic leadership and 
central authority.”  The “Japanese economic system of ‘catch up, surpass’ has made a 
contribution in the achievement of goals in expanding the scale of the economy, but [this 
economic system] has become a set of shackles today when [firms] must demonstrate creativity 
in every area in a period of historical change.” The main agent of change seemed to be the 
United States, which in the 1980s had reduced corporate and income taxes and introduced 
“thorough deregulation.” The United States also “boast[ed] overwhelming competitive power in 
the information and communications field that [was] said to be the leading industry of the 
twenty-first century.”  In general, the forces of globalization and the spread of the market 




the postwar period.”  With the collapse of the Cold War, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
Union, and China were entering the world economy and ushering in an “era of mega competition 
of contention by economic power” (Keidanren Hōkoku, 1995, 1-3). 
 To respond, the Japanese had to create a more flexible and innovative economic system. 
Not only the government, but large companies also had to change their ways.  Their policies of 
“long term stable employment and seniority pay” had helped create a “stable and safe society,” 
but these practices were “becoming an obstacle in realizing a society in which the Japanese 
economy is active through the creation of new industries and businesses and changes in the 
structure of industry” (Keidanren hōkoku, 1995, 5). Japanese firms faced formidable challenges 
to “respond to the needs of diversified consumers, quickly develop new goods and services, and 
deliver them at low cost….”  (Keidanren hōkoku, 1995, 6-8). 
This adjustment, according to the report, required basic structural reforms carried out by 
the government through changes in the tax system and deregulation.  The former changes 
included lowering the corporate tax to the level in the United States and abolishing the taxes on 
dividends, securities transactions, and land.  The latter changes included the “abolition of the 
Large Store Law by stages” (Keidanren hōkoku, 1995, 10-11).  With these suggested reforms, 
the report predicted, the economy would end its stagnation to grow for the next five years at a 
real rate of 3 percent per year.  (Keidanren hōkoku, 1995, 12-13).  
In January, 1996, Toyoda Shōichirō unveiled Keidanren’s long-term vision for the 
economy over the next quarter-century.  To realize an “active global nation” with an average 
growth rate of 3 percent per year, the Japanese had to reduce direct taxes, such as the income and 
corporate tax, and increase the consumption tax as an “indirect” levy.  Ideally the consumption 




2005.  Depending on the rate of increase in the consumption tax, the government would cease 
issuing all bonds either in 2010 or 2020 (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1996a).   
Conclusion 
 The basic attitudes of Keidanren, arguably the most powerful business group in Japan, 
became a major reason for the nation’s slow response to the economic crisis that developed 
rapidly in the early 1990s.  In the mid-1980s the federation responded to severe criticism from 
major trading partners, such as the United States, by advocating what it viewed as historic 
changes in Japan’s economic policies in lobbying for the liberation of the energy, flexibility, and 
creativity of the private sector. These structural reforms would entail fewer governmental 
controls over the economy, a substantial cut in government spending, lower taxes for 
corporations and their managers, higher taxes for consumers, a reduction of barriers to imports, 
and an emphasis on increasing domestic demand.  In the late 1980s, these business leaders 
simply were not prepared to view speculation in stocks or real estate as a major problem. In the 
early 1990s they initially viewed the decline in the price of real estate as a positive development. 
As the ramifications of the sharp drop in the stock market and the real estate market 
became increasingly evident in the early 1990s, Keidanren stuck with impressive consistency to 
its original prescription to solve Japan’s economic ills, even while other business groups lobbied 
for more forceful efforts to stimulate the economy through increased government expenditures 
and/or tax cuts. In fact, the federation would countenance a cut in the income tax only if it were 
offset by raising the levy on consumption.  Even when the federation agreed in 1995 to the use of 
public funds to help resolve the problem of non-performing loans, it did so reluctantly while 




term recovery to keep a focus on structural reforms to enhance the long-term vitality of the 
Japanese economy.  
 In fact, its proud backing for “administrative reform” provided a basis for the important 
legal and managerial policy changes that some scholars have contended have occurred, along 
with significant progress in deregulation (Schaede, 2012).  As one study has concluded, “The 
1990s was [the decade] for the actualization of the advancement of deregulation….”  Indeed, the 
period from 1990 to 2001 saw the implementation of over 3,500 items out of more than 4,000 
that the Administrative Reform Commission proposed for deregulation, including changes to the 
Large Store Law (Ogawa and Matsumura, 2005, 105-112).  
Clearly, as suggested by proposition #2 above, Keidanren merits attention as a major 
participant in the formation of Japanese national economic policy during the lost decade.  
Tracing the positions that the group took during the period of the economic bubble and the 
subsequent onset of the economic crisis reveals parallels between proposals of the federation and 
policies of the government.  As noted previously, the Japanese government did not dramatically 
increase spending until 1994.   As the economy showed signs of positive economic growth in 
1996, the cabinet in 1997 duly enacted a raise in the consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent, just as 
Keidanren proposed.  It is a sobering thought that shortly after this bold act of fiscal probity the 
Japanese economy suffered a relapse that lasted another six years. 
One area into which research could expand would be to broaden the examination of the 
business community to more fully include other groups.  Another fruitful topic would center on 
an investigation of how members of appointed study committees within Keidanren reconciled 
differences among themselves to produce their proposals.  The federation embraced a variety of 




could disagree on recommendations for national policy.  Finally, one could probe further the 
ways in which Keidanren sought to influence government officials.  The Keidanren Weekly 
Reports (Keidanren shūhō) record regular interaction between members and government 
officials through organized discussions, and the group regularly sent proposals about various 
issues to government agencies and ministries.  The challenge would be to track more precisely 
the trail of an idea as it moved from the private sector to enactment as public policy. 
 Interestingly, during 2010 as the Japanese economy continued to feel the effects of the 
global economic crisis that began in 2008, the policies of Keidanren remained essentially the 
same as they were twenty-five years earlier.  As one might expect, the federation continued to 
advocate deregulation (Yomiuri shinbun, 2010c).  In addition the group campaigned for a 
lowering of the corporate tax and, to maintain fiscal soundness, a rise in the consumption tax.  In 
April, 2010, Keidanren began to advocate a gradual increase in the consumption tax to a level of 
10 percent, a doubling of the levy, by the latter half of the 2020s in order to restore confidence in 
social security programs and in the government’s finances (Yomiuri shinbun, 2010a; Yomiuri 
shinbun, 2010b; and Yomiuri shinbun, 2010d).  Not long afterwards, members began pushing for 
a 5 percent cut in the corporate tax.  As before, the justification centered on the need to help 
Japanese firms become more internationally competitive by reducing the comparatively high rate 
of the levy, which was approximately 40 percent (Yomiuri shinbun, 2010e).  It is perhaps a 
testimony to the strength of Keidanren’s convictions in the mid-1980s that its agenda for reform 
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